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INTRODUCTION
After initially being arrested in the early morning hours of July 28,2007, for being
in a park after hours in violation of the Boise Municipal Code, appellant Stephen Donald
Newman was charged and convicted by jury of the crime of attempted rape. Evidence of
Newman's conduct at the time of his arrest could not have justified his conviction. When
encountered by Boise police officers, Newman was sitting in his vehicle alone; there was
no potential victim of a sexual assault in the area.
Following Newman's arrest, at a time when he was handcuffed and sitting some
distance from his vehicle, the arresting officers conducted a warrantless search of his
vehicle. That search incident to the arrest for the after-hours violation resulted in the
seizure of extensive materials which led prosecuting authorities to conclude that Newman
had formed a plan to lure a woman to the park with the intent to rape her. After the
District Court denied a pretrial motion to suppress all evidentiary fruits of the warrantless
vehicle search, that evidence formed the indispensable core of the state's case at trial.
In the briefing on the defense motion to suppress, appellant's counsel cited a
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court, State v. Gant, which clearly supported appellant's
position on the illegality of the warrantless vehicle search. Appellant also noted that the
United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Gant for the purpose of revisiting
the issue of the circumstances under which searches of vehicles incident to arrest are
constitutionally permissible. That left the District Court in the unenviable position of

having to predict the outcome of a high court ruling that would not be issued until after
decision of Newmau's motion to suppress. If the high court reversed the Arizona
Supreme Court and upheld the legality of the search in Gant, then a similar result should
have obtained here. But if the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Arizona Supreme Court in Gant, its opinion would dictate suppression of the seized
evidence in this case.
The District Court denied appellant's motion to suppress, approving the
evidentiary seizure in this case as the product of a permissible search incident to arrest.
Subsequently, in Arizona v. Gant,, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the United States Supreme
Court held unconstitutional the vehicle search in that case.

Arizona v. Gant controls the single claim raised by this appeal. This Court should
rule that the search of appellant's vehicle was unconstitutionally conducted, reverse
appellant's conviction, and remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with its decision.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Stephen Donald Newman was charged on August 11,2007 by complaint
with a single count of attempted rape in violation of Idaho Code 5 18-6101,306. (R p. 11)'
A grand jury indictment followed on August 21St.(R p.17)

' The Clerk's Transcript in this case consists of only one volume, and is unlined.
For that reason, volume and line references to the Clerk's Transcript are omitted.

On February 7,2008, Newman filed a motion challenging the legality of a
warrantless search of his vehicle following his arrest that resulted in the discovery of
virtually all of the prosecution evidence in the case. (R p.39) After a March 14,2008,
hearing on the motion, the District Court denied the motion. (R p.54)
Following further motions and related hearings that are not the focus of this
appeal, Newman was tried by a jury beginning July 11,2008. (R p.123) The jury returned
a guilty verdict on July 16,2008. (R p.145)
On November 19,2008, the District Court sentenced appellant Newman to a total
sentence of 15 years in prison -7 and a half years to be fixed, and the remaining 7 and a
half years to be indeterminate. (TR Vol. 1, p. 799, L. 3-8)

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Facts Relating to Newman's Arrest and the Search of His Vehicle

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, officers testified about the circumstances
leading to Newman's arrest and the search of his car. (TR Vol. March 14,2008) Officers
described the same circumstances at trial. The description below is taken from both
proceedings. As will appear, none of the relevant facts are in dispute.
On July 27,2007, Boise resident Gretchan Heller responded to an ad for an iPod in
the "free" section of Craigslist. (TR Vol. 1, p. 262, L. 2) A reply at around 3 p.m that day
from a person calling himself Terry explained that the iPod was his wife's, that she had
cheated on him, and that it was therefore his right to give it away. (TR Vol. 1, p. 264, L.

20) At about 10 p.m., Heller received another message from Terry stating that if she was
still interested in the free iPod, he would send directions to its location. (TR Vol. 1, p.
266, L. 25 ) In that follow-up message, Heller was told to go to a park at Eagle and
McMillan. (TR Vol.1, p. 268, L. 1) There she would find a Porta Potty; the iPod would be
inside the Porta Potty, on top of a towel holder. (TR Vol.1 p. 268, L. 5)
Heller believed something suspicious was going on. (TR Vol. 1, p. 268, L. 21) She
and her husband traveled to the area of the park to see if there was a vehicle waiting. (TR
Vol. 1, p. 269, L. 3-14) She saw a car in the park. (TR Vol. 1, p. 277, L. 3 ) At that point
Heller and her husband went to an Albertson's parking lot near the park, and called the
police. (TR Vol. 1, p. 275, L. 3)
Boise Officer Cory Bammert reported to the Albertson's lot at 11:52 p.m. (TR Vol.
1, p. 304, L. 1-4) A backup unit of Officers Abercrombie and Coltrin arrived soon
thereafter. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 6, L. 25) After hearing from Heller, Bammert and
the backup officers went into the park and observed a maroon SUV with its lights off.
(TR Vol. 1, p. 306, L.8) Bammert checked inside a nearby Porta Potty but found no iPod.
(TR Vol. 1, p. 306, L. 12-14)
Bammert then did a passenger side approach to the SUV. (TR Vol. March 14,
2008, p. 9, L. 24) The SUV had tinted windows and Bammert did not believe it was
occupied. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 11, L. 17) Bammert knocked on the window. (TR
Vol. March 14,2008, p. 12, L. 8) The driver, later identified as Stephen Newman, rolled

down the window. (Vol March 14,2008, p. 12, L. 22) Newman reported that he had been
parked for an hour and a half working on his computer. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 13,

L. 1) Although it was a hot night, Newman was wearing a knit cap. (TR Vol. 1, p. 308, L.
13-17) Bammert saw a pair of ski gloves in the passenger seat. Newman said the gloves
had been there a while. (TR Vol. 1, p. 308, L. 23; TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 6)
After a short conversation, Bammert told Newman to step out of the car in order to
place him under arrest for being in the park after hours, in violation of Boise Municipal
Code $3 13-03-05 to 13-03-10. (TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 15; TR Vol. 1, p. 331, L. 16; TR
Vol. March 14,2008, p. 13, L. 11) Newman was ordered out of the car and placed under
arrest solely for that offense. (TR Vol. March 14,2008 p. 62, L. 7) Bammert testified that
Newman was under arrest from the time he left his car. (TR Vol. 1, p. 331, L. 25) At that
point Abercroinbie was at the rear of the car and Coltrin was on the driver's side. (Vol
March 14,2008, p. 13, L. 15)
On his way to meet Newman by the driver's door, Bammert met Officer
Abercrombie at the rear of the SUV; Abercrombie said Newman was sticking something
behind the seat.. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 13, L. 20) Bammert then observed that
Newman was placing something between the seats with his right hand, although he did
no1 testify that he identified the item. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 13, L. 22) When he
reached Newman on the driver's side, Bammert asked him what he had placed between
the seats. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 14, L. 19) Newman did not say at first. (TR Vol.

March 14,2008, p. 14, L. 22)2
Newmm exited the car. (TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 14) Bammert handcuffed him and
sat him on the curb. (TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 15; TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 33, L. 25)
Having secured Newman away from his vehicle on a charge of violating the Boise code
provision, and not before, the officers searched the vehicle incident to that arrest. (TR
Vol. March 14,2008, p. 34, L. 3 et seq. )

B.

The Fruits of the Search Incident

For all practical purposes, the prosecution's attempted rape case against Newman
was comprised of evidence seized by police during the search incident. Having placed
Newman under arrest, handcuffed him, m d secured him in a location away from the
SUV, the officers entered the SUV.
The officers found a kitchen knife under the ski gloves that were located in the
front passenger seat. (TR Vol. March 14,2008 p. 34, L. 25) Bammert admitted that he did
not see the knife until the search incident to arrest. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 35, L. 6)
Officers seized a pellet gun located behind the driver's seat. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p.

The officers testified that the pellet gun was discovered as part of the search
incident to arrest, and not before. (TR VoI. March 14,2008, p. 66, L. 23) As Newman
was being handcuffed he told the officers he had dropped a pellet gun behind his seat.
(TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 67, L. 3) Abercrombie testified that at about the same time
he observed a part of the pellet gun through the window. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 67,
L. 11) He later testified that the gun was located during the search incident. (TR Vol.
March 14,2008, p. 70, L. 22)

70, L. 5 et ~ e q . The
) ~ pellet gun was not loaded. (TR Vol. 1, p. 334, L. 9) The officers
discovered that the back seat of the SUV was down. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 15, L.
21) They found a men's belt in the back of the car.
The officers found and seized a laptop computer which Newman was working on
when he was arrested. (TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 22) The laptop contained numerous
electronic files which the prosecution introduced into evidence at trial to tie Newmau to
the free iPod ad, and to support its claim that Newman intended to commit rape on July
27,2007.
C.

The Trial Evidence

The jury saw two movies (Exhibits 16 and 17) downloaded from the seized
computer depicting Newman and a woman engaged in sex acts on what appeared to be
two separate occasions. During the defense case, the woman depicted in the video as
Ruby testified that her participation in the roleplaying was entirely consensual. (TR Vol.
1, pp. 591-597) In the video, Newman and Ruby roleplay long rape scenes. Newman is
seen and heard berating, beating, and (seemingly) forcibly penetrating Ruby. In addition
to the sexual acts, Newman threatens Ruby with a knife.
In e-mails between Newman and the woman he calls Ruby (Exhibits 20-28),
Newman told Ruby that he would love to rape her and asked how rough he could get with

Having discovered the gun during the search incident, Bammert added a charge
of carrying a concealed weapon to the arrest. B m e r t was clear, however, that at no
point on the night of Newman's arrest was he charged with attempted rape.

her. In another, Newman described a fantasy in which he rapes a college student whose
car has broken down.
A detective described commercially produced videos that were located on

Newman's laptop, although the movies were not played in the courtroom. The jury heard
about a video in which a woman walks into a bike repair shop and two men sexually
assault her in various ways. That video had an identifier at the bottom of the screen:
www.rapeserver.com. (TR Vol. 1, p. 362, L. 22 et seq.)
The jury also heard about various e-mails Newman apparently sent from his laptop
and Internet searches Newman conducted during the twenty-four hours before his arrest.
(TR Vol. 1, p. 378, L. 21 et seq.) The prosecution offered Exhibit 18, which was a time
line of activity on Newman's computer during that period. The prosecution contended
without challenge from the defense that Newman was responsible for all of the activity.
in the early hours of July 27,2007, "Sara" answered from Newman's computer a
Craigslist ad for someone looking for a female roommate. (TR Vol. 1, p. 380, L. 17) In
the e-mail, Sara asked whether she could come see the apartment. (TR Vol. 1, p. 380, L.
21) Sara sent an e-mail to another woman looking for a roommate. (TR Vol. 1, p. 381, L.
13) Later Sara inquired about a prom dress that was listed for sale. (TR Vol. 1, p. 383, L.
7) Next Sara sent a message asking whether a wedding dress that had been listed was still
available. (TR Vol. 1, p. 383, L. 18) Sara sent another message regarding yet another
wedding dress a short time later. (TR Vol. 1, p. 384, L. 4)

A few hours later, shortly before 9 a.m. on July 27th, Newman checked responses
to an ad he had posted regarding free therapy. (TR Vol. 1, p. 384, L. 18) Newman then
sent another message checking on the availability of one of the wedding dresses. (TR Vol.
1, p. 385, L. 17) Newman then accessed one of the videos on the laptop. (TR Vol. 1, p.
385, L. 20) At around 9:30 a.m., Craigslist sent Newman a message confirming that his
iPod listing had been posted. (TR Vol. 1, p. 387, L. 2) In some of the correspondence
relating to the iPod, Newman used an email address at "anonymousspeech.com" which
would make it difficult for the government to locate the person attached to the address.
(TR Vol. 1, p. 517, L. 15)
A person named Amanda responded to the iPod ad and shortly thereafter Newman
conducted a search on Myspace for the e-mail address amansell1181@yahoo.com. (TR
Vol. 1, p. 387, L. 22) Gretchan responded to the iPod ad at about 3:30 p.m. (TR Vol. 1, p.
394, L. 6) Newman also conducted a search for the name "Carly Bovee" which was the
name of one of the people selling a wedding dress. (TR Vol. 1, p. 388, L. 11) Later in the
day Newman checked Amanda's Yahoo.com profile. (TR Vol. 1, p. 390, L. 13)
Amanda e-mailed at 4:48 to ask whether she could pick up the free iPod. (TR Vol.
1, p. 391, L. 12) Newman conducted other people searches between 5:48 and 6:19 p.m.
on July 27". (TR Vol. 1, p. 391, L. 15) At 6.19 p.m. he searched for an address: 4654
Newberg in Boise. (TR Vol. 1, p. 391, L. 21)
Newman sent an e-mail to Gretchan at 10:03 p.m. in which he says "I know it's

late, I'll wait 15 minutes." (TR Vol. 1, p. 393, L. 6) He sent a similar message to Amanda
a short time later. (TR Vol. 1, p. 393, L. 24) At 10:06 p.m. Newman sent Gretchan a
message saying no one has claimed the iPod. (TR Vol. 1, p. 394, L. 16) Gretchan wrote
back to say that she would love to have it. (TR Vol 1, p. 394, L.18) Newman then
conducted searches to try to identify Gretchan. (TR Vol. 1, p. 395, L. 7) He found
pictures of her on Myspace. (TR Vol. 1, p. 399, L. 5) He eventually sent her the e-mail,
ultimately provided by Gretchan to the police, which gave her directions to the park and
told her where she could find the iPod.
Police also identified various Google searches conducted on Newman's computer
in the days before his arrest (Exhibits 29 and 30), which included the following: Boise
student housing (which corresponded to one of the ads for a r o o m t e ) , the definition of
sexual assault, the average sentence for rape, rapist, details of rape, as well as numerous
other searches related to rape, rape statistics, and air guns. (TR Vol. 1, p. 403, L.4 to p.
407, L.5)

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
UNDER THE SUPREME COURT'S GANT DECISION,
WAS THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO A W S T IN THIS
CASE UNCONSTITUTIONAL; SHOULD THE
EVIDENTIARY FRUITS OF THAT SEARCH HAVE
BEEN SUPPRESSED; AND WAS THE
INTRODUCTION OF THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
PREJUDICIAL?
ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER THE SUPREME COURT'S GANT DECISION, THE SEARCH
INCIDENT TO ARREST IN THIS CASE WAS ILLEGAL; ITS FRUITS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; AND THE ADMISSION OF THE
TAINTED EVIDENCE WAS NOT HARMLESS
A.

Procedural History

Newman filed a motion to suppress challenging the warrantless search of his
vehicle immediately following his arrest for a municipal code violation on July 27, 2007.
In that motion he made two arguments. First, he argued the arrest violated his federal due
process sights because it was predicated on a vague statute that provided inadequate
notice of the conduct prohibited by the Boise ordinance prohibiting entry into the park
after hours. As such, the fruits of the unlawful arrest should have been suppressed.
Second, Newman argued that in light of the nature of the offense for which he had
been arrested - being in a park after hours -the search incident to that arrest was not
conducted to protect the officers or reveal evidence of the municipal code violation, and
thus the warrantfess search was not a valid search incident to arrest. In his reply brief,
Newman directed the District Court's attention to the case of State v. Gant, an Arizona

case as to which the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari to revisit the
question whether police may indiscriminately search a vehicle following the arrest and
detention of the driver.
The District Court denied Newman's motion. It rejected the argument that the
Boise ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, a ruling Newman does not challenge in this
appeal. It also held that under existing Supreme Court precedent, the search incident to
Newman's arrest was valid. (R p. 66) As will appear, that ruling was reversible error.

B.

Under the Supreme Court's Recent Decision in Arizona v. Gant,
the Search Incident To Arrest in this Case Unquestionably
Violated the Fourth Amendment

An officer's warrantless entry of a vehicle to search it or to seize items within is
presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
unless the state demonstrates it fell within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973); State v.

Gomez, 144 Idaho 865, 870,'172 P.3d 1140, 1145 (Ct.App. 2007). When a warrantless
search has been challenged, it is the state's burden to prove the applicability of such an
exception. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,455 (1971); State v. Brauch, 133
Idaho 215,218-19,984 P.2d 703,706-07 (1999). If the government fails to meet its
burden, the evidence obtained as a result of the search, including evidence later
discovered and seized by exploitation of the original illegal search, is inadmissible at trial.

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219,984 P.2d at

The search of Newman's car was concededly,warrantless.The sole theory offered
by the prosecution below to justify the search, and the only one relied on by the District
Court in its order denying suppression, was the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement. But in light of Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the very case
to which Newman referred in his suppression briefing, there can now be little doubt that
the search incident to arrest in this case was invalid and thus that the District Court erred

.

when it denied Newman's suppression motion.
Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and secured in
the back of a police car. Id. at 1714. Conducting a search incident to the arrest, police
found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the back seat of Gant's vehicle. Id. The
Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrestexception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, as defined in Chime1 v. Cal~ornia,395 U.S. 752
(1969), and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, did not
justify the search.
In reviewing the Arizona decision on certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
began with core principles:
Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it
should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a
warrantless search, with the basic rule that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically

established and well-delineated exceptions."Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347,357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576
(1967) (footnote omitted). Among the exceptions to the
warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341,58
L.Ed. 652 (1914). The exception derives from interests in
officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically
implicated in arrest situations. See United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218,230-234,94 S.Ct. 467,38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973);
Chimel, 395 U.S., at 763,89 S.Ct. 2034.
Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1716.
The Court then criticized the extremely expansive reading often given Belton:
Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be
authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant
notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle's passenger
compartment will not be within the arrestee's reach at the time
of the search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search
incident to every recent occupant's arrest would thus untether
the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel
exception-a result clearly incompatible with our statement in
Belton that it "in no way alters the fundamental principles
established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of
searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."453 U.S., at 460,
n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2860.Accordingly, we reject this reading of
Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.

Gant made clear that the contention that containers within a vehicle can be
subjected to warrantless searches is founded on the incorrect assumption that an arrested
occupant of that vehicle does not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy as to such

containers:
[Tlhe State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at
stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist's privacy
interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, see
New Yorkv. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-113, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89
L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), the former interest is nevertheless
important and deserving of constitutional protection, see
Knowles, 525 U.S., at 117, 119 S.Ct. 484.It is particularly
significant that Belton searches authorize police officers to
search not just the passenger compartment but every purse,
briefcase, or other container within that space. A rule that
gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an
individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there
is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be
found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to
the privacy of countless individuals.

Id., at 1720.
The Gant Court concluded:
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
oflease of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a
search of an arrestee's vehiclewill be unreasonable unless
police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the
warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court
correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search.

Id. at 1723 (emphasis added).
Arizona v. Gant was decided in 2009, after both the ruling on appellant's
suppression motion and his trial and conviction. Nonetheless, it fully applies to any
criminal conviction still on direct appeal at the time of the Supreme Court decision. See

Grfjth v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,328 (1987) ("a new rule for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
review or not yet final . . . .")
For example, following Gant, the United States Supreme Court ordered the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its decision in United Stales v.
Gonzalez, 290 Fed. Appx. 51 (9" Cir. Aug. 7,2008) (hereafter Gonzalez 0. In Gonzalez I,
the defendant was in a vehicle driven by another party when the vehicle was stopped and
the driver arrested for outstanding warrants. Gonzalez was handcuffed and secured in a
police car when the police searched the vehicle and found a firearm in the glove
compartment. Having been charged and convicted of a firearm violation for possessing
the firearm, Gonzalez brought a motion to suppress on the ground that the search of the
vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights; the motion was denied by the district
court.
In Gonzalez I, , the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the denial of the suppression
motion. Following the post-Gant remand, however, the Circuit reversed itself and ordered
suppression of the evidence of the firearm obtained in the vehicle search. United States v.
Gonzalez, 2009 WL 2581738 (9" Cir. 2009) (Gonzalez IT). Gonzalez 11explained that the
Circuit had rested its first decision "on the Supreme Court's holding in New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981), which has been read by our court as permitting a
warrantless vehicle search incident to the arrest of an occupant of the vehicle." 2009 WL

2581738 "1. The Gonzalez 11 panel then stated: "In Gant, the Court affirmed the Arizona
Supreme Court's holding that the broad reading of Belton by our and other courts was
error." Id. The Ninth Circuit continued:
Reading Belton more narrowly, the Court announced as the
rule for vehicle searches incident to arrest: "police may search
a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.
When these justifications are absent, a search of an arsestee's
vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or
show that another exception to the warrant requirement
applies.

Id. (quoting Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1723-24)
The Circuit went on to reject the government's argument that the search could be
upheld as made "in good faith under the then-prevailing interpretation of Belton and that,
therefore, the exclusionary rule should not be applied." Id.
The Government relies on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009),
which applied the good faith exception of United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in holding that whether the
exclusionary rule should be applied to a search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment turns on the culpability of the police
and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police
conduct. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. Neither the Supreme
Court nor our court, however, has applied the good faith
exception to the scenario we face: a search conducted under a
then-prevailing interpretation of a Supreme Court ruling, but
rendered unconstitutional by a subsequent Supreme Court mling announced while the defendant's conviction was on direct
review. The cases the Government relies on involve application of the good faith exception to searches conducted in reli-

ance on a warrant held invalid following the search; see, e.g.,
Herring 129 S. Ct. at 698; or a statute or regulation
subsequently found unconstitutional during direct review of
the defendant's conviction; see, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340 (1987); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2004).
We conclude, however, that this case should be controlled by
long-standing precedent governing the applicability of a new
rule announced by the Supreme Court while a case is on direct
review. The Court has held that a decision of this Court
construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied
retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the
time the decision was rendered. United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537,562 (1982); see Grifith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
328 (1987) (finding that even decisions constituting a "clear
break" with past precedent have retroactive application). This
precedent requires us to apply Gant to the current case
without the overlay of an application of the good faith
exception. To hold that Gant may not be fully applied here, as
the Government urges, would conflict with the Court's
retroactivity precedents.
Such a ruling would undermine the rationale of Johnson and
Grzfith. As stated in Grifith, "failure to apply a newly
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on
direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication." 479 U.S. at 314. It would violate "the integrity of judicial review" by turning the court into, in effect, a legislative
body announcing new rules but not applying them, rather than
acting in our proper role as an adjudicative body deciding
cases. It also would "violate[ ] the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same" by allowing only one
defendant to be the beneficiary of a newly announced rule. Id.
at 322-23.
Id., at *2.
Gonzalez I1 noted that the Supreme Court had not relied on a good-faith exception

in Gant itself, a post-Herring case.
In Gant, the Supreme Court upheld in full the decision of the
Arizona Supreme Court, which not only found the search at
issue unconstitutional, but ordered the suppression of the
evidence found as a result of the unconstitutional search. See
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724; State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640,646
(Ariz. 2007). Hence, refusal to allow Gonzalez similarly to
benefit from the Court's ruling in Gant through application of
the exclusionary rule would implicate the same concerns
mandating the Court's holding in Grijjjth.
Because both Johnson and Grzfith remain binding precedent,
we cannot apply the good faith exception here without
creating an untenable tension within existing Supreme Court
law. We, therefore, hold that evidence derived from the search
at issue must be suppressed and reverse Gonzalez's
conviction.
Id. at *2.

Of equal importance, under its state constitution, Idaho has rejected the claim that
the fruits of a search conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be admitted on
the ground that the search, while unconstitutional, was conducted in good faith. State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (This Court rejects rule that fruits of search
conducted on basis of invalid warrant can be admitted at trial because officers relied in
good faith on validity of defective warrant); Idaho Constitution, art. 1, 3 17.
The Guzman court said this: "In sum, we finally and unequivocally no longer
adhere to a policy of sheepishly following in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in
the area of state constitutional analysis. Based on our independent analysis of the merits
of the good faith exception, as viewed in light of long-standing provisions of our Idaho

Constitution, we are convinced that it is ill-conceived and cannot be reconciled with art.

I, 3 17 of our state constitution. Accordingly, we conclude that the citizenry of Idaho will
be better served if it no longer controls. We so hold." 122 Idaho at 998,842 P.2d at 677.
Given that this Court has rejected a good faith exception in the context of a search
conducted pursuant to a defective warrant, a fortiori such an exception cannot be
recognized in the context of a warrantless search and seizure. Thus, irrespective of
whether federal courts other than the Ninth Circuit hold that a Leon-Herring good faith
rule pennits admission of evidence unconstitutionally seized prior to Gant during vehicle
searches conducted incident to arrest, under Idaho law the fruits of such an illegal search
incident to arrest must be suppressed.

C.

The Search Herein At Issue Was Violative of the Fourth Amendment
As Applied in Gant

The search of Newman's car was concededly warrantless. The sole theory offered
by the prosecution below to justify the search, and the only one relied on by the District
Court in its order denying suppression, was that of the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement. But in light of Gant, the very same cause of action cited by
Newman in his suppression briefing in the trial court, there can no doubt that the search
incident in this case was unconstitutional and thus that the District Court erred when it
denied Newman's suppression motion.
This Court freely reviews the trial court's determination whether, on the facts
found, constitutional standards were violated. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655,658, 152

P.3d 16, 19 (2007). The bright line rule of Gant requires suppression in this case. As
Officer Bammert testified both during the suppression proceedings and at trial, when he
ordered Newman out of the vehicle, Newman was under arrest for the sole offense of
remaining in the park after hours. Newman left the car without resisting and the officers
handcuffed him and placed him on the sidewalk away from the SUV.
Under Gant, at that point the officers had no right to enter the car without a
warrant. Newman was handcuffed and secured and outside reaching distance of the car.
The elements of the municipal violation for which he had been arrested -physical
presence in the park after a given hour - were not subject to disputc4 It is impossible to
reasonably assert that the searching officers were seeking, or could possibly have
obtained, evidence in appellant's vehicle relevant to the crime for which Newman had
been arrested. For example, it would be patently ridiculous to suggest that Newman's
computer was seized as evidence relevant to the after hours charge. Thus, the warrantless
search constituted a violation of Newman's Fourth Amendment rights, requiring
suppression of its f r ~ i t s . ~
Specifically, Newman was arrested for violating Boise Municipal Code 3 13-0305 E which states: "No person shall enter or remain in the park during hours of closure,
except for purposes of transit through the park, or as authorized by permit." Section 1303-08 sets for the relevant hours of operation of the city's parks as "every day of the year
from sunrise to sunset."
Having seized Newman's laptop as part of the illegal search incident to arrest, the
police eventually got a warrant to search it. (TR Vol. June 18,2008, p. 31, L. 1 et seq.)
Indisputably the legality of the warrant depended entirely on the validity of the original
search. The search was illegal under Gant, so its fruits, including the eventual search of

D.

Reversal Is Required

Reversal due to the admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment requires reversal unless the state demonstrates "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18,24
(1967). It simply cannot be reasonably argued that the error in admitting the illegally
seized evidence was harmless. Without the laptop, Newman could never have been
charged with an attempted sexual assault.
Certainly the prosecution believed the evidence on the laptop was key to its case.
Following a motion by Newman to exclude much of the evidence on the laptop, the state
fought mightily to keep that evidence in the case; indeed, at the pretrial hearing under
I.R.E. 404(b) on the admissibility of the computer evidence, the state asserted that "the

only way we know his crime plan is by admitting this evidence." (TR Vol. July 2,2008 p.
118, L. 2-4). The prosecution's closing arguments rested almost wholly on the evidence
which should have been suppressed. In both her opening argument and rebuttal, the
prosecutor relied heavily on items that were seized as part of the search incident to arrest.

(See, e.g., TR Vol. 1 , p. 638, L. 11, 19; p. 644, L. 21; p. 646, L. 16). And she spent the
bulk of both her opening and rebuttal arguments stressing the contents of Newman's
laptop computer: e-mails, videos, Google searches, and so forth. (See, e.g., TR Vol. 1, p.
640, L. 5; p. 641, L. 13; p. 642, L. 25; p. 642, L. 15; p. 643, L. 22; p. 645. L. 20; p. 645,

the computer, was illegal as well. Wbng Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
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L. 25; p. 646, L. 1; p, 647, L. 7; p. 647, L. 25; p. 648, L. 1-25; p. 649, L. 1-25; p. 677, L.
16; p. 678, L. 1-25)
Because appellant's conviction resulted almost exclusively from evidence derived
from the unconstitutional search of appellant's vehicle, the erroneous admission at trial of
the illegally seized evidence cannot possibly be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court must vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for further
proceedings. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,203 P.3d 1203 (Sup.Ct. 2009)(court
vacates conviction and remands for further proceedings after reversing District Court's
denial of suppression motion) State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 103 P.3d 448 (Sup.Ct.
2004)(same); State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778,963 P.2d 1215 (Ct.App. 1998)(same).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse appellant Newman's conviction
and remand for further
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